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REGULAR A R T C L E 
Abolition of the Insanity Defense 
Violates Due Process 
Stephen J. Morse, JD, PhD, and Richard J. Bonnie, JD 
This article, which is based on and expands on an amicus brief the authors submitted to the United States Supreme 
Court, first provides the moral argument in favor of the insanity defense. It considers and rejects the most 
important moral counterargument and suggests that jurisdictions have considerable leeway in deciding what test 
best meets their legal and moral policies. The article then discusses why the two primary alternatives to the insanity 
defense, the negation of mens rea and considering mental disorder at sentencing, are insufficient to achieve the goal 
of responding justly to severely mentally disordered offenders. The last section considers and rejects standard 
practical arguments in favor of abolishing the insanity defense. 
JAm Acad Psychiatry Law 4 1:488-95,2013 
In November 2012, the Supreme Court declined to 
grant certiorari in an Idaho case, Delling v. Idaho, 1 
which urged the Court to consider whether the Due 
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution require all jurisdictions to retain some 
form of the insanity defense. Justice Breyer, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented from 
the denial of certiorari. 
Idaho abolished the insanity defense in the early 
1980s and instead permits defendants to introduce 
evidence of mental disorder solely for the purpose of 
negating the mens rea required by the definition of 
the crime charged. John Joseph Delling had paranoid 
schizophrenia and believed that his victims were 
stealing his essence by shrinking his brain and that he 
had to kill them to save his life. He carefully planned 
the killings and succeeded. Mr. Delling clearly 
formed the intent to kill, the mens rea required for 
murder, but the judge also explicidy found that he 
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his con-
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duct due to his severe mental illness. No insanity 
defense was available, and he was therefore convicted 
of murder. Consequently, the validity of his convic-
tion turned squarely on whether an independent in-
sanity defense is constitutionally required. 
We submitted an amicus brief in Delling on behalf 
of 52 law professors, urging the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari and to decide the constitutional ques-
tion in Mr. Delling's favor. In the course of his brief 
dissent, Justice Breyer referred to the "Law Profes-
sors' brief," as well as an amicus brief submitted by 
the American Psychiatric Association and the Amer-
ican Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, in support 
of granting certiorari. In the Law Professors' brief, we 
argued that the affirmative defense of legal insanity 
has such a strong historical, moral, and practical ped-
igree and is so ubiquitous that providing some form 
of an insanity defense is a matter of fundamental 
fairness in a just society. It gives doctrinal expression 
to fundamental moral and legal principles that have 
been recognized by the common law for centuries 
and that the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowl-
edged. Jurisdictions have substantial leeway in decid-
ing what test best meets their legal and moral poli-
cies, but some form of affirmative defense is "so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental" as a principle of 
substantive justice (Ref. 2, p 105), and, accordingly, 
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required by the Due Process Clause. In this article, 
we present and elaborate upon these arguments. 
The first section provides the moral argument in 
favor of the insanity defense. Then it considers and 
rejects the most important moral counterargument. 
Finally, it suggests that jurisdictions have consider-
able leeway in deciding what test best meets their 
legal and moral policies. The second section discusses 
why the two primary alternatives to the insanity de-
fense, the negation of mens rea and considering men-
tal disorder at sentencing, are insufficient to achieve 
the goal of responding justly to severely mentally 
disordered offenders. The last section considers and 
rejects standard practical arguments in favor of abol-
ishing the insanity defense. 
Why the Insanity Defense Is 
Constitutionally Required 
This section provides the positive argument in fa-
vor of the moral necessity of providing an insanity 
defense, considers the primary counterargument, 
and concludes with discussion of what test is 
required. 
The Moral Necessity of the Defense of Legal 
Insanity 
Blame and punishment by the state are fundamen-
tally unfair and thus a violation of the Due Process 
Clause if an offender was not responsible for his 
crime. The affirmative defense of legal insanity ap-
plies this fundamental principle by excusing those 
mentally disordered offenders whose disorder de-
prived them of rational understanding of their con-
duct at the time of the crime.3- 5 This principle is 
simple but profound. Indeed, in recognition of it, the 
insanity defense has been a feature of ancient law and 
of English law since the 14th century.6 - 8 1t was uni-
versal in the United States until the last decades of the 
20th century, and there is still a near consensus 
among state and federal lawmakers that the defense 
must be retained.9 
The concept of responsibility connects with our 
most fundamental convictions about human nature 
and dignity and our everyday experience of guilt and 
innocence and blame and punishment. It also ex-
plains our common aversion to the idea that we 
might simply be like machines responding to neural 
activities in the brain and our resistance to thinking 
of all wrongdoing as sickness. Failing to provide an 
insanity defense confounds the meaning of what it is 
to be responsible for one's actions. It cheapens the 
idea of being a responsible person by classifYing and 
holding responsible persons intuitively regarded as 
fundamentally nonresponsible. 
In both law and morals, the capacity for reason is 
the primary foundation for responsibility and com-
petence. The precise cognitive deficit a person must 
exhibit can, of course, vary from context to context. 
In the criminal justice system, an offender who lacks 
the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his 
actions as the result of severe mental disorder does 
not deserve full blame and punishment and must be 
excused in a sufficiently extreme case. Moreover, 
such offenders cannot be appropriately deterred be-
cause the rules oflaw and morality cannot adequately 
guide them. Failing to excuse some mentally disor-
dered offenders is inconsistent with both retributive 
and deterrent theories of just punishment. 
A similar baseline principle explains the many 
competence doctrines employed in the criminal jus-
tice process. This Court has long recognized that, at 
every stage, justice demands that some people with 
severe mental abnormalities must be treated differ-
ently from those without substantial mental impair-
ment, because some impaired defendants are incapa-
ble of reason and understanding in a specific context. 
Competence to stand trial, 10 competence to plead 
guilty and to waive counsel, I I competence to reRre-
sent oneself,12 and competence to be executed 3 ' 14 
are all examples in which the Constitution requires 
such special treatment. It is unfair to the defendant 
and offensive to the dignity of criminal justice to 
treat people without understanding as if their under-
standing was unimpaired. Evidence of mental disor-
der is routinely introduced in all these contexts to 
determine whether the defendant must be accorded 
special treatment. 
Legally insane offenders are not excused solely be-
cause they had a severe mental disorder at the time of 
the crime. The mental disorder must also impair 
their ability to understand or appreciate that what 
they are doing is wrong or some other functional 
capacity that a jurisdiction believes is crucial to re-
sponsibility. The criminal acts of those found legally 
insane do not result from bad judgment, insufficient 
moral sense, bad attitudes, or bad characters, none of 
which is an excusing condition. Rather, the crimes of 
legally insane offenders arise from a lack of under-
standing produced by severe mental abnormality and 
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thus they do not reflect culpable personal qualities 
and actions. To convict such people offends the basic 
sense of justice. 
The impact of mental disorder on an offender's 
responsibility and competence is recognized 
throughout criminal law. Even the few jurisdictions 
that have abolished the insanity defense recognize 
that mental disorder affects criminal responsibility 
because it permits the introduction of evidence of 
mental disorder to negate the mens rea for the crime 
charged. 15 ·16 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
state infliction of stigmatization and punishment is a 
severe infringement (Ref. 17, pp 363-4). The insan-
ity defense is grounded in long-recognized legal and 
moral principles and on routinely admissible evi-
dence. Even if a defendant formed the charged mens 
rea, it is unfair to preclude a defendant from claiming 
and proving that he was not at fault as a result oflack 
of understanding arising from a severely disordered 
mind. That is precisely the issue D elling raised. 
Historical practice, the near universal acceptance 
of the need for an independent affirmative defense of 
legal insanity, and the fundamental unfairness of 
blaming and punishing legally insane offenders pro-
vide the strongest reasons to conclude that funda-
mental fairness and the Due Process Clause require 
an insanity defense. Abolishing this narrowly defined 
and deeply rooted defense could plausibly be justi-
fied only if an alternative legal approach could reach 
the same just result or if irremediably deep flaws pre-
clude fair and accurate administration of the defense. 
The next two main sections show that there are no 
such alternatives and that the defense is no more 
vulnerable to risks of mistake and abuse than any 
other disputed issue in the penal law. 
Response to the Counterargument 
The late Norval Morris presented the most recent, 
important, nonconsequentialist argument for abol-
ishing the insanity defense in his book, M adness and 
the Criminal Law. 18 Professor Morris suggested nu-
merous consequentialist arguments for rejecting the 
insanity defense, but, believing in desert as a limiting 
principle in criminal law, he confronted directly "the 
question of fairness, the sense that it is unjust and 
unfair to stigmatize the mentally ill as criminals and 
to punish them for their crimes" (Ref. 18, p 6 1). In 
brief, M orris argued that other causes, such as social 
disadvantage, are far more criminogenic than mental 
disorder (including severe disorder); yet, he pointed 
out, we do not excuse those who are poor or the 
products of broken homes. Morris concluded, " [a]s 
a rational matter it is hard to see why ~ne should 
be more responsible for what is done to one than 
for what one is" (Ref. 18, p 63). This conclusion is 
surely correct. It does not follow from the argument 
presented for it, however, which makes a morally 
irrelevant comparison between socially disadvan-
taged persons and persons with severe mental 
disorders. 
Morris confuses causation with excuse, a confu-
sion that has consistently bedeviled clear thinking 
about criminal responsibility. Causation is not per se 
an excusing condition in criminal law. All behavior is 
caused, even if we are often ignorant of the causes. If 
causation were an excuse, no one would be held re-
sponsible for any behavior, criminal or not. More-
over, causation is not the equivalent of the subspecies 
of the genuine excuse that we term compulsion. 
Compulsion exists when the person faces a regretta-
ble hard choice that leaves him with no reasonable 
alternative to wrongdoing. We also sometimes say 
that people are compelled if they yield to an internal 
desire that they find it extremely difficult to resist. 
Again, if causation were the equivalent of compul-
sion, no one would be responsible, because all behav-
ior would be compelled. Causation is not the ques-
tion; nonculpable lack of reason and compulsion are 
the genuine excusing conditions. 
Consider the case of a person whose extreme irra-
tionality stems from the unknowing ingestion of a 
powerful hallucinogen. Such a defendant, who is not 
responsible for the ingestion of the drug, is not held 
responsible for a consequent crime. How can we dis-
tinguish this case from that of a person who commits 
a crime in response to motivations produced by se-
vere mental disorder, say, a sudden command hallu-
cination buttressed by a consistent delusional belief 
that the action is necessary? Mentally disordered de-
fendants who are not responsible for their condition 
should also be excused. In both cases, the defendant 
is excused not because the behavior was caused- all 
behavior is caused- but because the defendant was 
sufficiently irrational and was not responsible for the 
irrationality. 
The reason we do not excuse most disadvantaged 
criminals (or those whose criminal behavior can be 
explained by other powerful causes) is not because we 
lack sympathy for their unfortunate backgrounds or 
because we fail to recognize that social disadvantage 
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is a powerful cause of crime, as it surely is. Rather, 
most disadvantaged defendants are held responsible 
because they possess minimal reason and are not 
compelled to offend. A disadvantaged defendant 
whose stress causes him to be mentally disordered 
will be excused because he is disordered, not because 
the abnormal mental state is caused by disadvantage. 
Similarly, most mentally disordered persons are held 
responsible for acts influenced by their disorders be-
cause they retain sufficient reason to meet the low 
threshold standards for responsibility. In sum, the 
criteria for moral autonomy and responsibility are 
the capacity for reason and lack of compulsion, 
whereas the criteria for excuses are that the person is 
nonculpably lacking the capacity for reason or 1s 
compelled. 
The Test for Legal Insanity 
Like the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American 
Academy ofPsychiatry and the Law (AAPL), the Law 
Professors' brief did not endorse any particular test of 
insanity. This perspective is in keeping with the Su-
preme Court's long-standing reluctance to intrude 
too deeply into the sphere of state policymaking re-
garding the substantive criminal law. As Justice Mar-
shall's plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas said: 
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the 
collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which 
the common law has utilized to assess the moral account-
ability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doc-
trines of actus reus, mem rea, insanity, mistake, justification, 
and duress have historically provided the tools for a con-
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the 
evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, 
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of 
man. This process of adjustment has always been thought 
to be the province of the States [Ref. 19, 535-6]. 
At the same time, the Law Professors' brief, like 
the AP N APPL brief, identified the core content of 
the traditional insanity defense as the incapacity to 
understand the wrongfulness of one's actions. 20 In 
one form or another, this deficit best explains the 
various tests adopted by 46 states and the federal 
criminal code. How . such lack of understanding 
should be defined doctrinally and whether more con-
troversial control tests21 '22 should be adopted at all 
are matters within the province of the states and the 
federal government. 
Alternatives to the Insanity Defense Are 
Not Morally Adequate 
This section first addresses the mens rea alternative 
and then considers sentencing. 
The Mens Rea Alternative 
The negation of mens rea and the affirmative de-
fense of legal insanity are different claims that avoid 
liability by different means and trigger different out-
comes. The former denies the prima facie case of the 
crime charged; the latter is an affirmative defense that 
avoids liability in those cases in which the prima facie 
case is established. The postverdict consequences are 
also different. The former leads to outright acquittal; 
the latter results in some form of involuntary civil 
commitment. The two different claims are not sub-
stitutes for one another. 
The primary reason that permitting a defendant to 
introduce evidence of mental disorder to negate mens 
rea cannot replace the affirmative defense of legal 
insanity to achieve justice is that the mens rea alter-
native is based on a mistaken view of how severe 
mental disorder affects human behavior. In virtually 
all cases, mental disorder, even severe disorders 
marked by psychotic symptoms such as delusions 
and hallucinations, does not negate the required 
mens rea for the crime charged23 (Ref. 5, p 933). It is 
difficult to prove a negative, but cases, especially 
those involving serious crime, in which the mens rea 
for every offense charged is negated are extremely 
rare. Rather, mental disorder affects a person's rea-
sons for action. A mentally disordered defendant's 
irrationally distorted beliefs, perceptions, or desires 
typically and paradoxically give him the motivation 
to form the mens rea required by the charged offense. 
They usually do not interfere with the ability to per-
form the necessary actions to achieve irrationally mo-
tivated aims. 
Consider the following typical examples begin-
ning with Daniel M'Naughten himself.24 In 
MNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), 
M'Naughten delusionally believed that the ruling 
Tory party was persecuting and intended to kill him 
(Ref. 25, p 10). As a result, he formed the belief that 
he needed to assassinate Prime Minister Peel to end 
the threat. He therefore formed the intention to kill 
Peel. Thus M'Naughten would have been convicted 
of murder if a defense of legal insanity had not been 
available. Indeed, his case has come to stand for one 
of the rules enunciated by the House ofLords, that a 
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defendant should be acquitted on grounds of insan-
ity if he "was laboring under such a defect of reason, 
from a disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know 
it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong" (Ref. 24, p 722). For a more contemporary 
example, consider the case of Andrea Yates, the Texas 
woman who drowned her five children in a bathtub. 
She delusionally believed that she was corrupting her 
children and that unless she killed them, they would 
be tortured in Hell for all eternity?6 She therefore 
formed the intention to kill them. Indeed, she 
planned the homicides carefully. Ms. Yates was 
nonetheless acquitted by reason of insaniry because 
she did not know that what she was doing was wrong. 
Even if she narrowly knew the law of Texas and her 
neighbors' mores, she thought the homicides were 
fully justified by the eternal good of the children 
under the circumstances. If only society knew what 
she knew, they would approve of her conduct as jus-
tified. For a fmal example, suppose an offender with 
aural hallucinations believes that he is hearing God's 
voice or delusionally believes that God is communi-
catin9 with him and that God is commanding him to 
kill. 2 If the offender kills in response to this com-
mand hallucination or delusion, he surely forms the 
intent to kill to obey the divine decree. Nonetheless, 
it would be unjust to punish this defendant, because 
he, roo, does not know right from wrong, given his 
beliefs, for which he is not responsible. 
In all three cases, one could also claim that the 
defendants did not know what they were doing in a 
fundamental sense, because the most material reason 
for action, what motivated them to form mens rea, 
was based on a delusion or hallucination that was the 
irrational product of a disordered mind. N everthe-
less, in all three cases, the defendants' instrumental 
rationality, the ability rationally to achieve their 
ends, was intact despite their severe disorders. T hey 
were able to carry out their disordered plans 
effectively. 
Mr. Delling's case is consistent with this most typ-
ical pattern of legal insanity claims in which the de-
fendant clearly had the mens rea required by the def-
inition of the crime but lacked capacity to 
understand or appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct. He indisputably had a major mental disor-
der, paranoid schizophrenia, and as a result, delu-
sionally believed that his victims were stealing his 
powers and would thereby kill him. He therefore 
believed that he needed to kill the victims to save his 
own life. His grossly delusional belief was the cause of 
his formation of the intent to kill. It is afso undis-
puted that he carefully planned his victims' deaths 
and learned from one failed attempt. Such evidence 
of his instrumental rationality is consistent with hav-
ing such delusional beliefs. The trial judge explicitly 
found that Mr. Delling did not know right from 
wrong under the circumstances. Nonetheless, he was 
convicted of murder because legal insanity was un-
available as a defense. 
Mr. Delling was not a morally responsible agent. 
He was completely out of touch with reality concern-
ing his victims and the actions necessary to save his 
own life. He did not deserve blame and punishment 
for his murders. He is no more to blame than some-
one with dementia, for example, who acts on the 
basis of similarly disordered beliefs. It is true, of 
course, that Mr. Delling poses a genuine threat to 
social safety as long as he remains deluded, but com-
mitment after an insanity acquittal is more than suf-
ficient to protect public safety, as 46 states and the 
federal jurisdiction have recognized by having com-
mitment statutes that require acquittees to prove 
their suitability for release and that establish tightly 
controlled programs of community supervision 
when the acquittees are released. 
To further understand the injustice of the mens rea 
alternative, consider a case in which mens rea may 
plausibly be negated. Suppose a defendant charged 
with murder claims that he delusionally believed that 
his obviously human victim of a shooting was in 
reality a rag doll. If that were true, the defendant did 
not intentionally kill a human being. Indeed, in a 
mens rea alternative jurisdiction, he could not be con-
victed of purposely, knowingly, or recklessly killing a 
human being, because his delusional beliefs negated 
all three mental states. Mter all, he fully believed that 
he was shooting at a rag doll, not a human being. The 
defendant would be convicted of negligent homi-
cide, however, because the standard for negligence is 
objective reasonableness and the motivating belief 
was patently unreasonable. 
Of course, convicting the severely disordered de-
fendant of a crime on the basis of a negligence stan-
dard is fundamentally unjust, as even Mr. Justice 
Holmes recognized in his rightly famous essays on 
the common law (Ref. 28, pp 50- 1). The defen-
dant's unreasonable mistake was not an ordinary 
mistake caused by inattention, carelessness, or the 
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like. Defendants are responsible for the latter, be-
cause we believe that they have the capacity to behave 
more reasonably by being more careful or attentive. 
In contrast, the hypothetical defendant's delusional 
mistake was the product of a disordered mind, and 
thus he had no insight and no ability to recognize the 
gross distortion of reality. He was a victim of his 
disorder, not someone who deserves blame and pun-
ishment as a careless perpetrator of manslaughter. He 
does not deserve any blame and punishment, and 
only the defense of legal insanity could achieve this 
appropriate result. Paradoxically, such a defendant's 
potential future dangerousness if he remains deluded 
would be better addressed by an insanity acquittal 
and indefinite involuntary commitment than by the 
comparatively short, determinate sentences for invol-
untary manslaughter. 
Thus, the mens rea alternative is not an acceptable 
replacement or substitute for the insanity defense. 
Only in the exceedingly rare case in which mental 
disorder negates all mens rea would the equivalent 
justice of a full acquittal be achieved, albeit for a 
different reason; but again, this is the rarest of cases. 
Most legally insane offenders form the mens rea re-
quired by the definition of the charged offense, and 
only the defense of legal insanity can respond justly 
to their blameworthiness. Finally, a defendant who 
negated all mens rea would be entitled to outright 
release and subject only to traditional involuntary 
civil commitment, which is far less protective of pub-
lic safety than postinsanity acquittal commitment. 
Sentencing 
Consideration of mental disorder for purposes of 
assessing both mitigation and aggravation is a staple 
ofboth capital and noncapital sentencing, but it is no 
substitute for the affirmative defense oflegal insanity. 
On moral grounds, it is unfair to blame and punish a 
defendant who deserves no blame and punishment at 
all, even if the offender's sentence is reduced. Blam-
ing and punishing in such cases is unjust. Sentencing 
judges might also use mental disorder as an aggravat-
ing consideration, as occurred in Delling, because it 
might suggest that the defendant is especially danger-
ous as a result. Thus, sentences of severely mentally ill 
offenders might not be reduced or might even be 
enhanced. Again, injustice would result, and public 
safety would not be protected as well as an indeter-
minate postacquittal commitment would achieve. 
Third, unless a sentencing judge is required by law to 
consider mental disorder at sentencing, whether the 
judge does so will be entirely discretionary. Again, 
this is a potential source of profound injustice if the 
sentencing judge fails to consider severe mental dis-
order in an appropriate case. In short, only a required 
insanity defense would ensure that arguably blame-
less mentally disordered offenders have an opportu-
nity to establish that the stated blame and punish-
ment are not justified. 
Practical Objections to the Insanity 
Defense are Inconsequential 
Several objections to the insanity defense have 
been raised by proponents of abolition, including 
those in Idaho, bur they are insubstantial and provide 
not even a rational basis for abolishing a defense with 
such a profound historical, moral, and legal basis. 
They certainly cannot survive a more searching anal-
ysis. In general, these objections relate to supposed 
difficulties of administering the insanity defense 
fairly and accurately. Specific objections include that 
administering the defense requires an assessment of 
the defendant's past mental state using controversial 
psychiatric and psychological evidence, a task that is 
too difficult; acquitting insane defendants endangers 
public safety; the defense produces wrong verdicts; 
and defendants use it to beat the rap. 
Assessing Past Mental State Using Psychological 
and Psychiatric Evidence 
It is often difficult to reconstruct past mental states 
and, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, psy-
chological and psychiatric evidence can be problem-
atic (Refs. 9, p 740 -1 ; 29, p 413). Nevertheless, if all 
jurisdictions, including mens rea alternative jurisdic-
tions, concede the necessity of proving mens rea (for 
most crimes) before punishment may justly be im-
posed, then their argument against the insanity de-
fense based on the difficulty of reconstructing past 
mental states must fail unless assessing past intent, 
knowledge, and other types of mens rea is easier than 
assessing whether the defendant was acting under the 
influence of severely abnormal mental states. After 
all, both mens rea and legal insanity refer to past 
mental states that must be inferred from the defen-
dant's actions, including utterances. The severe dis-
order that is necessary for practical support of an 
insanity defense is in most cases easier to prove than 
ordinary mens rea. Despite the problems with mental 
health evidence, all but four jurisdictions believe that 
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assessing legal insanity at the time of the crime with 
mental health evidence is feasible. Indeed, it is rou-
tine. Moreover, the abolitionist jurisdictions permit 
introduction of such evidence to negate mens rea. 
Unless abolitionist jurisdictions are prepared to ar-
gue-and none has-that assessing mens rea with 
mental health evidence is uniquely reliable, the argu-
ment based on the deficiencies of mental health evi-
dence lacks credibility. Indeed, one could claim that 
the severe disorder that is practically necessary to sup-
port an insanity defense is easier to prove than ordi-
nary mens rea because it is, by definition, obvious. 
Finally, mental health evidence is routinely admitted 
in a vast array of civil and criminal contexts, includ-
ing all the criminal competencies and sentencing. 
Public Safety 
As previously argued, the insanity defense poses no 
danger to public safety. Successful insanity defenses 
are so rare that deterrence will not be undermined, 
because few legally sane defendants will believe that 
they can avoid conviction by manipulatively and 
falsely raising the defense. More important, every 
jurisdiction provides for commitment to a secure 
mental facility after a defendant has been acquitted 
by reason of insanity and the Supreme Court has 
approved the constitutionality of indefinite confine-
ment (with periodic review) of such acquittees as 
long as they remain mentally disordered and danger-
ous?0·31 (Ref. 5, p 932). Further, the Supreme Court 
has approved procedures for the commitments that 
are more onerous for acquittees than standard civil 
commitment.30 It is of course true that acquittees 
may be released earlier than if they had been con-
victed and imprisoned, but there is no evidence that 
released ac'\uittees pose a special danger to the 
community. 2- 36 
Wrong Verdicts 
Another objection is that the insanity defense is 
especially prone to erroneous verdicts. This objection 
is unwarranted. 
There is no evidence that the factual determina-
tions concerning whether a defendant has a severe 
mental disorder incapacitating him from under-
standing the wrongfulness of his conduct are espe-
cially prone to error. Expert evidence on these con-
cerns is routinely admitted and is subject to the usual 
rules of cross-examination. 
The ultimate value judgments that the insanity 
defense requires, such as the question of whether the 
defendant is incapable of understanding the wrong-
fulness of his conduct, are no more intractable or 
unreliable than the many other value judgments that 
the criminal law asks finders of fact to make, such as 
whether the defendant grossly deviated from the 
standard of care to be expected of a reasonable per-
son, or whether an intentional killer was reasonably 
provoked. In our American system of justice, it is 
entirely appropriate to leave to the jury considerable 
discretion to judge, in light of all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case, whether the defen-
dant's mental disorder undermined his criminal re-
sponsibility. Drawing the line between guilt and 
innocence is the task of the finder of fact as the legal 
and moral representative of the community. 
Complaints about erroneous insanity acquittals 
are factually exaggerated because the incidence of 
such acquittals is low and the complaints are specu-
lative. There is no reason to believe that the insanity 
defense is particularly prone to error compared with 
other, equally indeterminate, value-laden criminal 
law doctrines. The wrong-verdict argument does not 
provide a legitimate policy reason for abolishing the 
insanity defense. 
Beating the Rap 
Few defendants who are actually legally sane in 
some objective sense beat the rap with the insanity 
defense. Experts using the proper diagnostic tools 
can reliably distin~uish people who are faking major 
mental disorder.3 Further, it is best estimated that 
the insanity defense is raised in less than one percent 
of federal and state trials and is rarely successful38·40 
(Ref. 39, pp 361-6). The complaint that this defense 
allows a large number of guilty criminals to avoid 
conviction and punishment is simply unfounded. 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike generally rec-
ognize that insanity is a defense of last resort that 
betokens an otherwise weak defense and that rarely 
succeeds. Insanity acquittals are far too infrequent to 
communicate the message that the criminal justice 
system is soft or fails to protect society. It is impossi-
ble to measure precisely the symbolic value of these 
acquittals, but it is also hard to believe that they have 
much impact on social or individual perceptions. So 
few insanity pleas succeed that neither aspiring crim-
inals nor society assumes that conviction and punish-
ment will be averted by raising the defense. 
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If the defendant is genuinely legally insane and 
succeeds with the defense, he deserves to be acquitted 
and has not beaten the rap at all. The tough-on-crime 
justification that underlies this argument is based on 
a fundamental misconception about the meaning of 
an insanity acquittal. In successful insanity defenses, 
the prima facie case for guilt has been established, and 
the verdict thus announces that the defendant's con-
duct was wrong. Nonetheless, the defendant did not 
deserve blame and punishment and will be confined 
by commitment. 
Conclusion 
Until the latter part of the 20th century, all Amer-
ican jurisdictions had some version of the insanity 
defense. Even now, only four states deny defendants 
the use of the defense. The affirmative defense of 
legal insanity has such a strong historical, moral, and 
practical pedigree and is so widely accepted that pro-
viding it is a matter of fundamental fairness in a just 
society. Jurisdictions have substantial leeway to de-
cide what test best meets their legal and moral poli-
cies, but some form of affirmative defense is a pre-
requisite of justice, and its constitutional status under 
the Due Process Clause should be explicitly recog-
nized. It is part of the legal tradition and collective 
conscience of the nation. Further, no alternative will 
achieve equal justice by other means. 
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